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Abstract
This paper studies the dynamic evolution of a joint venture that is
initially formed due to the complementary strengths of two firms. We
analyze the impact of the investment choices of the two partner firms on
the fate of the joint venture. Investments that improve a firm's efficiency in
the activity it performs in the joint venture (complementary investments)
suffer from an incentive problem since benefits of such investments are
shared between the two firms. To minimize the inefficiency caused by this
incentive problem , the firm whose input is more valuable to the joint venture
should receive a larger share of the joint venture revenues. Wh en each firm
invests in learning about the activity performed by its partner (competing
investments) , the joint venture may itself fail since such investments reduce
the synergy anslng from complementarity. If firms can choose between
the two types of invèstments , the joint venture suffers from a coordination
problem and t \V o type of equilibria coexist: one in which both firms make
complementary investments and the joint venture survives with increased
complementarity and another in which firms make competing investments
and the joint venture is taken over by one of the partners.
JEL Codes: L23 , F23
"' Lin: Department of Economics , Lingnan College , Hong Kong. 已 mail: plin @l n.edu.hk. Saggi
(corresponding author): Department of Economics , Southern Methodist University, Dallas ,
Texas 75275-0496. E- mail: ksaggi@mai l. smu.edu; phone: 21ι768-3274; fax: 21 4- 768-182 1. This
paper has benefited from the comments of seminar audiences at Florida International University,
Rice University, Southern Nlethodist University, and the University of Oklahoma.

1. Introduction
A fundamental theoretical rationale behind joint ventures (JVs) is that firms with
complementary strengths can benefit from joint production. This theoretical idea
has substantial empirical support. In a recent survey of seventy six JVs in six
developing countri白， more than sixty five percent of the respondents rated knowledge of local politics , government regulations , local customs , and local markets
as important considerations for seeking local partners (see Miller 的. al. 1995).
Similarly, more than seventy percent of the local firms in developing countri臼
sought out JVs with multinationals because of their superior product and process
technologies ωwell as international reputation. 1 Similar findings for different
countries are reported in Beamish (1987) and Selassie (1995).2
Empirical evidence also indicates that a signi且cant number of JVs terminate
in their early years. For example , Kogut's (1989) study of life histories of ninety
two JVs revealed that thirty five of these failed within seven years. 3 Even those
that survive seem to have problems: a survey by Killing (1982) reports that thirty
six percent of the partners in JVs found JVs to have performed unsatisfactorily.
The more recent survey by Miller et al. (1995) also reports similar results: twenty
seven percent of the JVs surveyed were not expected to survive by its partne乎﹒
Taking complementarity as the motivation for the existence of a JV , in this
paper we explore the dynamic evolution of the enterprise. 4 Our intuitive view of
-I JVs frequently involve firms from different countries.
Intuition suggests that scope for
complementarities is bound to be large \\'hen firms come from different environments. For
example , from 1979 to 1993 , almost one hundred and seventy five thousand foreign investment
projects were approved in China , of which approximately seventy percent took the form of a
JV between a local firrn and a foreign firm and these accounted for approximately seventy five
percent of the total inward foreign investmen t. (Source: Almanac of China's Foreign Relations
and Trade 1994 ,)
2See Mogi (1996) for a CEO~s overview of the JV between Kikkoman Coporation of Japan
and President Enterprises of Japan. One strong rnotivation for this JV was the complentary
strengths of the two firrns. Also , Luo (199ï) reports that guαnxi (l ocal connections) by Chinese
firrns 吼叫e an important factor leading to JVs between Chinese firms and foreign firms.
3 As Kogut (1989) 的 tes ， since such JV s are typically forrned between experienced firms , one
would not expect failures rates to be so high. Since typically at least one of the partner firms
continues to survive , the dernise of a JV is somewhat different in character frorn the usual failure
(and shut down) of a business enterprise
"\Ve should note that JVs may arise for reasons other than complementarity As noted above ,
local governrnents often favor JVs over subsidiaries of multinational firms. Yu and Tang (1992)
discuss other potential motivations for formation of JVs. These include: cost reduction , risk
sharing , and competition reduction. See also Marjit et. a l. (1995) and Balakrishnan and Koza
,
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the evolution of JVs is as follows. Joint production requires considerable information exchange and substantial exposure to each other's production activity. This
exposure and information exchange makes it possible (or perhaps inevitable) for
each firm to learn to better perform the activity currently performed by its p位t
ne r. In other words , the very act of joint production under a JV may reduce the
degree of complementarity between partners due to mutuallearning on their part.
Wh ile some amount of learning may occur naturally due to close exposure to new
techniques , substantial improvements in efficiency are likely to require costly and
conscious inv臼tments by the two partners. We distinguish between investments
that increase incentiv臼 for joint production (complementary investments) 台om
those that reduce such incentives (competing investments). We show that a substantial com peting investment by one or both partners red uces the synergy arising
from complementarity and renders the JV an inefficient organizational form.
How empirically plausible is the argument that mutuallearning occurs in JVs?
Consider the following quotation 台om Li (1997) who reports the result of a d令
tailed study of eight JVs in China:
It was found that learning \vas the major objective of both Chinese
and foreign partners in forming a JV. The Chinese partners wanted to
learn about process and prod uct technology, international marketing ,
and modern management , where品 foreign partners wanted to learn
about local marketing , local management , and product technology in
China.
The possibility of learning from one's partner was also \vitnessed in the JV
between Honda and Rover in the United I(ingdom. Pilkington (1996) , in his discussion of the Rover-Horída relationship , argues that a JV can become the means
"to acquire the skills and capabilities which are needed for strategic development.
This certainly proved the motive in the case of Rover and Honda.." Similar factors may be the motivation behind many international JVs in the auto industry
\vhere US firms may have to sought to learn new Japanese management techniques
such as just-in-time inventory. For example , consider the JV between Toyota and
General 1-1otors (GM) established in 1984 called New United Motor Manufacturing Company Inc. (NU j\1MI). Toyota 's unique management style and philosophy
\vere introduced into NUìvlMI and GìvI executiv臼 made ~:active efforts to gain
a thorough understanding of the Toyota's management practices. Part of this
(1993) .
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effort was the establishment of a technical liaison 0伍ce near the NUMM1 plant ,
which documented Toyota's management practices and conveyed this information
to GM. Subsequently, GM adopted many of Toyota's practices and started using
them in other pla帥" (World 1nvestment Report , 1995).5
Like any other enterprise , JVs may fail for a multitude of reasons. The literature on international management , policy makers , and business consulting
firms frequently contribute failure of JVs to external factors , such as demand
shocks , incre泊ed competition , or government policy, as well as to internal disputes
within the enterprise that may arise from cultural differences between partners
and cl前hes between labor and management , etc. We believe that the internal
evolution of the enterprise , holding constant the external environment , may hold
important clues regarding the failure of JVs and that JVs may break up even in
the absence of any explicit disputes between partners. Our analysis shows that
the investment decisions of the two partners can very well be the crucial determinant of the survival of a JV. To our knowledge , ours is the 趾st theoretical
analysis of the dynamics of JVs based on the endogenous evolution of the degree
of complementarity between partners.
1n section 2 of the paper , we develop a benchmark model of a JV motivated by
complementary strengths. 1n section 3 , we examine the partners' incentive for investments that increase the synergy level of the JV (complementary investments).
We show that complementary investments are sub- optimal from the viewpoint of
the enterprise since each partner enjoys only a fraction of the marginal benefit
of its own investment. Vle also sho\Y that , to minimize this ine伍ciency， the firm
whose input is more important to the JV should receive more than half the JV's
revenue. In section 4 , we ana1yze investments that reduce the synergy of the JV by
making partners more like each othe r. \Ve show that such competing investments
can indeed 1ead to a break up of the JV in equilibrium and that they do not suffer
from incentive problems since they resu1t in sole ownership of the enterprise. 6
In section 5 , we bring together our insights from the previous two sections
by constructing a 1arger game in which the two firms can choose to make either
a comp1ementary investment 0r a competing one. Here our ana1ysis revea1s that
υ Usi 時 data

from US-Japan JVs , Nakarnura et. a l. (1996) provi
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there exist two types of Nash equilibria: one in which the partners make competing
investments leading to the failure of the JV and the other in which the JV surviv~可
with increased profitability as both partners select complementary investments.
One may interpret this cφexistence of equilibria 臼 the intrinsic instability of JVs:
those JVs choosing the complementary investment equilibrium will survive and
grow and those that happen to choose the competing equilibrium will end up in
a break-up.
Finally, section 6 concludes. Proofs of all propositions and lemm臼 are presented in the appendix.

2. Basic Model
Consider two firms: firm 1 and firm 2 who form a JV to produce output z with
two inputs x and y.7 For concreteness , think of input x as management and
y as marketing. While both firms can supply both inputs , firm 1 is more efficient at supplying x and firm 2 is more efficient at supplying y. We model this
complementarity by employing the following production function for the JV:

z = (81X1 + 82X2) α(γ1Y1 + γ2Y2 戶， α+β< 1
\vhere Xi (Yi) is the amount of input X (y) provided by firm 丸 and 81 > 82 > 1 and
γ2 >γ1 > 1. Obviously, in the JV firm 1 supplies input x while firm 2 supplies
input Y . The production function for the JV is given by
zJ

=

AJxα Yβ(2.1)

\vhere A J
8 1 α 勻 2β ， x
X1 and Y
Y2. 8 Parameters αand ß me前ure the
inlportance of the t\VO inputs , respectively, to the JV.
Let the cost (disutility) functions of the two inputs x and Y be given by C(x)
and D(y) , C' > 0 , C" ~三 0 ， D' > 0 , and D" 三 O. For simplicit y九 we consider the
C也 e \vhere C(x) = x and D(y) = y
70 ur benchmark model is similar to that of Eswaran and Kotwal's (1985) model of sharecropping and that of Bl叫t. acharya and Lafontai肘 's (1995) model of franchising.
1:\ 1n the literature , the production function of the JV usually involves a random element ， η
which has zero mean so that: zJV = A J\ ' ~rαUβ+η. This noise term implies that the JV p訂 t
ners ' individual efforts can not be inferred simply by observing the output , making cooperation
between partners di伍 cul t. 1ncluding this random variable in our analysis would not affect our
analysis because the random term disappears when we calculate the expected profits of both
partners.
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The revenue generated by the JV is shared by the two partners. Let ()i denote
firm i's share of total revenue , where B1 + B2 = 1. As in Eswaran and Kotwal
(1985) , the two firms choose their input efforts non-cooperatively to maxi rnÏ ze
their individual profits. 9 1n particular , firm 1 chooses x to solve the following
problem:
λ4αX B 1 A J xαUβ -x

(2.2)

yielding the first order condition
α B 1 A J xα -1 y ß =

1

Similarly, firm 2 chooses y to solve the following problem:

Max B 2 A J xαUβ

-y

yielding the first order condition
ß 2 B 2 A J xα yß-1

=

1

We can rewrite the two first order conditions as
x= αB 1 z J and y =

ßB 2 z J

Substituting these equations back into the production function in equation (2.1)
yields the JV's output as well ωrevenue (price is normalized to one)

zJ = (叫了才可 (αB 1 ) 兩(加2) 南

(2.3)

Using the above revenue ì we calculate the profits of both firms as
π {=B 1 z J -x=B 1 (1 一 α )zJ

(2 .4)

= B2 zJ - Y = B2 (1 - ß)zJ

(2.5)

and
π~.

Adding the two gives the total value of the JV
πJ

π{+π~ = [8 1 (1 一 α)

+ 8 2 (1 一 β )] z J

(2.6)

。 See Svejnar and Smith (1984) for a model ofa joint venture that explores resource allocation
and profit distribution among partners under various institutional scenar ios . Unlike us , their
main focus is on static issues.
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Remark 1: Although the JV enjoys the synergy of complementarity, it suffers
from the well-kno\vn problem of under-provision of inputs: each partner supplies
less input than is jointly optimal since each receives only a faction of the marginal
benefit of providing its input. Because of this problem , the JV does not necessarily
generate higher revenue than a firm that is solely owned by one of its partners
if the complementarity of assets within the JV is not very strong (i.e. , if the
difference between 81 and 82 or bet\veenγ2 and γ1 is not large). As we will see ,
this observation is important in our discussion of competing investments in section
4 below.
Using the model developed above as a building block , we next turn to some
dynamic issues. The next three sections will argue that when the two partners
can make inv臼tments to improve their abilities at supplying the two inputs , their
investment choices determine the evolution of the JV.

3. Complementary Investments
Suppose firm 1 can improve its ability at providing x by making a costly investment while firm 2 can do the same with regard to input y. Specifically, firm 1 can
reach a target efficiency level of Ê:l 1 by inv臼ting an amount d1(Ê:l 1 - 81) , where
d1 denotes the unit cost incurred in improving the e伍ciency of input x. Similarly
firm 2 can r aise its e伍ciency of input y to r 2Y by investing an amount ~ (r 2 一 γ2).
For simplicity, \ve assume d~ = d1 = d. 10
The structure of the investment game is as follo\vs. First the t\VO firrns choose
their investment levels non-cooperatively. Next , given their efficiency at their
respective activities; they choose their input levels and production takes place at
the final stage. 11 To obtain a su b- game perfect N ash equilibrium , we solve the
game backwards.
At the output stage , the efficiency parameters Ê:l 1 and r 2 are given. The
production function facing the JV is thus given by zl = Ê:l frg xαUβ. The choice of
input provision is exactly as solved in section 2. Using eqüation (2.3) we obtain
lOResults change in an obvious manner when investment costs are asymmetric.
e伍ciency parameters of individual inputs to the JV are
observable though the level of inputs might not be so. It is hard to imagine how firms can
form a JV if they do not kn O\v each other ‘ s e伍ciency parameters that determine the degree of
complementarity of their inputs

11 Note that we assume that the

the total output of the JV
Zl (ß 1

,r 2 ,( 1 )

=

(ßf r 2β) 亡土百 (α8d 立丘吉 (ß (1 - O t} )τ丘吉.

3.1. Investment Stage

At the investment stage , taking its rival's investment choice of r 2 as given , firm
1 chooses ß 1 (ß 1 這 8 1 ) to maximize its JV profit net of its investment cost:
Max 0 1 (1 一 α)Zl (ß 1 , r 2 )

-

d(ß 1

8d

-

The first order condition for the above problem is
------L- 81(1 一 α)
學對
------L(α8dτZ百 (ß02) h;一βAl
Iν-0-β =
1 一 α 一 β

which can be rewritten as

d

(3.1)

ß 1 = J(.)r 2 立在百

where

可

-~二三二且

I (1 一 α)8 1 (α( 1 ) 正勾 (ß8 2 ) 正三百|門叫
-

J(.)=||
d(l 一 α -

vu nn m
ri

O V

CU

'
••
A

ρU

A

m.'...'••A ar'A••

9起

QU
.',

ß)

QU

J..1αx 82 (1 - ß)zl (ß 1 , r 2 )

-

d(r 2 一 γ 2)

'\vith an analogous first order condition

r2 =

]<(.)ß{-0-2ß

where

(3.2)
.

...~三三二fi..

(1 - ß) ( α ( 1 ) l-~-ß (ß8 2 ) 再芒百 1
k(.)=||
d(l 一 α - ß)
1

1

0

- - 213

The above first order conditions explicitly define the reaction functions of the
t'\vo firms. It is easy to see that these reaction functions are upward sloping. 12
12The second order conditions for the firms are satisfied if 2α+β< 1 α+2β< 1 and the
，
,
cost parameter d is sufficiently smal l.
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Due to the complementary nature of the two firrns investments , an increase in investment by one firm increases the marginal benefit of the other firm's investment
and , hence , its optimal investment.
Let (ßr ，月) denote the pure strategy N 叫1 equilibriurn investment levels of
firms 1 and 2 , respectively.13 Wh ich firm has a stronger incentive to invest? The
following proposition says that two crucial factors determining the investment
incentives of the two firrns are the relative importance of their inputs (a versus
β) and their JV shares 8i .
Proposi tion 1: The following hold:
ωA;>FUf 叫仰ly if 81 >朮 ωhere b 三鉗王說;
戶i) The relative investment by firm i increαses 凹th its share 0 f the J 以
Consider the case where the two inputs are equally important for production
(α=β). In this case , part (i) of proposition one inforrns us that firm 1 's investment is higher than firm 2's (ßr > r 2) if and only if its share of the JV revenue
exceeds 50%. Likewise , when the firrns have equal shares in the JV (8 1 = 8 2 ) , it is
easy to see that firm 1 makes a higher investment than firm 2 if and only ifα > ß.
In general ，五rm 1 invests more than firm 2 in equilibrium either if its share in the
JV is higher th組 firm 1's share or if the input it supplies to the JV is relatively
important (i.e. ， αis big). For example , supposeα > ß. In this scenario , firm
1 may still invest more than its partner even when its JV share falls below 50%
provided it exceeds a certain thr臼hold (i.e. 8 1 >出)
It is also useful to examine the channels via which changes in the firrns' shares
affect equilibrium investments. 14 Consider the effect of an increase in 8 1 on firm
1's equilibrium investment
As 81 increases ,
is affected in three different
ways. First: an increase in 8 1 increases the marginal benefit of firm 1's investment
(its reaction function shifts up) incre的時 its incentive for investment. Second , an
increase in 8 1 simultaneously decreases the marginal benefit of firm 2's investment
(its reaction curve shifts do\vn). Since the t\VO firrns' investments are complementary, a reduction in firm 2's investment tends to decrease firm 1 's investment.
Lastly, altering the share of a firm in the JV also affects the equilibrium at the
output stage. This three effects interact to determine the net effect of a change in
8 1 on the equilibrium of the investment game. vVhile algebraic complexity does
not allow us to obtain clear cut results regarding the absolute investment levels

ßr.

ßr

1 :3 Straightforward

algebraic manipulations show that this equilibrium exists and is unique.
example , governments in lesser developed countries often impose restrictions on the
share of the JV that can be owned by a foreign partner .
14 For
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of the two firms , part (“) of the proposition 1 says that an increase in a firm's JV
share raises its incentive to invest , relative to its parlner. 15
3.2. Under-Investment Problem and Optimal Revenue Sharing
In the equilibrium derived above , each firm makes its decision without taking into
account the benefit of its investment to its partner. Thus , the investments of the
two firms are too low from the vie\vpoint of maximizing the value of the JV. In
other words , JVs are plagued not only by a static inefficiency but also a dynamic
one: not only is the JV's output is too low given the investment levels (due to the
under-provision of inputs problem) , the partners also under-invest in improving
their efficiency parameters. Thus , the investment incentiv臼 suffer doubly: the
inefficiency at the output stage worsens the inefficiency at the investment stage.
The severity of the under-investment problem depends crucially, of course , on
how the firms share the JV's revenue. Next we examine the feature of the optimal revenue-sharing scheme that minimiz臼 the ine伍ciency caused by the underinvestment problem. Let (.6. i(B 1 ) ，同 (Bd) denote the N ash equilibrium of the
investment game. Let B~ denote the share of firm 1 that maximizes the JV's total
profits given that firms choose their investments and inputs non-cooperatively:
。~ =Arg max

7r

JV

-

d .6. î - dr; = [B1 (1 一 α)+(1-B 1 )(1- β)]

zJ -

d.6. î - dr;

\vhere

zJ=/(4 月 ，( 1 ) = [(.6. î)O (r;) ß] 訂 (α( 1 ) 南 [ß(l 一的!南
The follo\vi I).g proposition states that the dynamically optimal arrangement of the
JV requires that a firm get a larger share of the JV than its partner if and only
if its input is more important than its partner's.
Proposition 2: Assume that Q + 3ß < 1 aη d 3 α + ß < 1. Then , Bî > ~ if
and only if α > ß.
The above proposition can be understood ωfollows. As \ve mentioned earlier ,
the under-provision of effort problem exists at both the output stage and the
investment stage. The optimal revenue sharing arrangement aims at minimizing
the combined ine伍ciency at the two stages. At the investment stage , if a firm's
15 A local result for absolute investment levels can be shown for the symmetric case α = ß,
15} = 1 '2 . Under equal sharing (8 1 = 8 2 ) , a small increase in a firm's share of the JV increases
its equilibrium investment while it decreases the other firm's investmen t.
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input is more valuable to the JV than its partner 冶， then its investment is a 1so
more valuable to the JV. Thus , this firm should be given a larger share of the
JV revenues in order to induce it to invest more. For the output stage , it is
easy to prove a 'static optimum result': when the e伍ciency parameters are fixed ,
maximizing the JV's revenue (or profits) over the shar臼 Ði requires that firm 1 's
share be greater than 1/2 if and only ifα > ß.IG Given this result , it is not
surprising that the 'dynamic optimum r臼ult' in proposition 2 holds.
We next examine the case where the two 且rms invest in im proving their efficiency of performing their partner's activity with the hope of taking over the
JV.

4. Competing Investments
Consider the case where each party can make a costly investment to improve
its ability of supplying the input currently supplied by it p位tner in the JV. In
particular , firm 1 can increase the level of γ1 in order to reduce its disadvantage
relative to firm 2 in performing activity y , and firm 2 can invest to raise 82 (its
efficiency in activity x). The unit costs of investment for the firms are dÏ and
d乞 respectively. Thus , by investing an amount dÏ (f 1 一 γ1)' firm can raise its
effectiveness of input y to f 1 from the original level γl' and firm 2 can raise its
efficiency of input x to ~2 by investing an amount d2(~2 - 82 )
The timing of moves is as follo\vs. The t\vo firms simultaneously choose their
investments f 1 and ~2. 8ince such competing investments lower the synergy of
the JV, the JV may cease to be the most e伍cient organizational form after such
investments have been made. 80 , at t he next stage of the game , the organizational
form (s01e o\vnershi p by Qne of the two firms or the JV) that 1eads to the high臼t
total pro且ts prevails. If the JV fails 了 a 五rm buys out its partner (see below) and
the latter exits the market. In the last stage , production takes p1ace under the
organization form t. hat. prevails in the previous stage.
1 GIn particular , maximizing the JV's total revenue yields firm 1 's(statically) optimal share
to be 8 1 =夭百 and maximizing the JV's total profits leads to 8 1 =
在于了 Both 叫utions

1+ 、/行計ifff

have the feature that 8 1 > 0.5 if and only

ifα 〉 β
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4.1. Output Stage

The output decisions , of course , depend upon the organizational form under which
production takes place. Given r 1 and ð. 2 , the JV continues to operate if the
complementarity is still relatively strong (i. e. , if 7r J 三 max{付， 1叫 where 可
denot臼 firm i's payoff as a sole owner de加ed below). The firms' investments 的
useless in this c臼e since the JV continues to operate b臼ed on the old efficiency
parameters.
If firm 1 produces on its own , its production function is given by
Zl

It

solv臼 the

= (8 1 x)O(r 1 y)β

(4.1)

follo\ving problem:
llttZ Z1-Z-U

The first order conditions are
α8 1α r 1 ß X O-1 y ß

which can be rewritten

=

前 x= α Zl

1 個d ß8 1 o r 1βzαUβ -1

and y =

ßZ1.

=

Solving for

1

Zl

yields

Zî = (r 1 ) 亡~(8~αα的計可
The corresponding

pro且t

(4.2)

for firm 1 is gi ven by

πî

= zî - x - y =

(1 一 α-

ß)zî.

(4.3)

Simi1arly, firm 2's optima1 profit if it is the sole owner is given by

九= (1 一 α-2)4where

z;=AF=百 (γfdββ)τ土ïJ

(4 .4)

4.1.1. Buy-Out of the JV

If a firm invests a su血 cient amount , the JV becomes less productive than a solely
owned enterprise. 1 7 If the JV fai1s , we 臼 sume that the firm with the more efficient
form of organization (the higher π:) buys out the other firm by paying the latter
a price equa1 to Bj 付 18
17The exact condition for π i > 7r J can be obtained by comparing equations (4.3) and (2.6).
1~
1f firm j's invetsment level is so low thatπ;<πJ ， the buy-out price equals firm j's old JV
revenue , ej 7r J
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The formulation of this buy-out price can be understood as follows. After
making a competing investment ，趾m 1 is capable of enjoying the payoff (gross)
可 but this requires that firm 2 be willing to sell its share of the JV. Of course ,
firm 2 is also capable of enjoying the (gross) payo叮叮 if firm 1 agrees to sell its
part of the JV. Since both firms may prefer to be buyers rather than sellers , we
assume that the following procedure is used to terminate the JV. Suppose , by way
of illustration , that 可>叮(>的 Fi肘， the two firms sell the JV to a “third
party" at the price 7r J which is then split between the partners in accordance
wi th their shares of the JV. Then , this third party sells all the assets of the JV
in an auction in which the two partners bid for the rights to the entire JV. The
outcome of the auction is that the partner with the highest valuation (firm i in this
example) wins by paying 可 to firm j. Lastly, the (neutral) third party distributes
its own profi ts from the auction ，可一 πJ ， to the partners according to their initial
shares of the JV. Under the above procedure ，位rm i's payoff equals the surn of
the following three terms:
Bi π JV

+

(π; 一 π;)

+ B i (π;

一 πJ) =π; 一 (1 - B i ) π;

Firm j' payoff then equals its initial JV profits plus its fraction of the “auction"
profits:
B(lí JV + B i ( π; 一 πJV)=OF;
Under the above buy-out price specification , the payoff of firm i , gross of its
investment cost , is given as follows: 1U
if

佇*-(]，;7ï~
J" J'
H

戶

V

TK==

.~[汁;

- Bj 7ï jJ + ~Bi 汁 :1

if
if

Bi 甘 i'

>π;

汁*

π*

π*

什;

<π;

One could imagine other methods of terminating the JV that result in buy-out
prices di 旺'e rent from the one that results from the procedure outlined above. For
example , one could assume that firm i can buy out firm j's share of the JV by
paying it the amount Bj 7r J - i.e. its current payoff as a partner in the JV. The
problen1 with this price is that it ignores the fact that firm j too has the option
of investing and operating the JV solely - in other words , it lets firm i choose the
1 !J If

the firms are equally prodl以 iv巳 i.e. ， if ππ; ， the buying out party is determined by
a coin toss ,,'ith each firm having an equal chance of being the buyer and the selle r.
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terms of the buy out. By contr a.s t , our procedure recognizes that both firms have
the option of making competing investments and each firm may be unwilling to
sell its share of the JV at a price which do臼 not let it profit from the option of
making a competing investment. In our view , the results that follow should go
through with any procedure which allows both firms to bene且t from the option of
making a competing investment.
4.2. Investment Stage

Knowing that their future payoffs are given by Vi above , firms make their investment choices simultaneously. Let ri denote firm l's optimal investment given
that it buys out the JV 企om its partner:
r; 三 Argmax 可 (r 1 ) 一 (r 1 一 γ l)di

where

一~ ，~~

- ()2 可 (ß 2 )
~. ~r:l

πi(r 1 ) = (1 一 α- ß)(r 1 )ï 一。一 β( 可以伊)亡Z百.

The first order condition for the above problem is 20

ß(ri) 空望著 (ðfa O ßß) 詰百 = â-{.
We similarly define ß 2 for
firm 1:

五rm

(4.5)

2's optimal investments , a.s suming it buys out

ß; 三 Argmax π;(~2) 一 (~2

-

ð2)d~

-

()1πi(rd

\vhere \ve must have

α(~;) 羊望著(活αo ßß) l-~-ß = d~.

(4.6)
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meters (α and ß) on the firms'
incentives for investment:
Assumption 1:γf=6?
Assumption 1 is a symmetry a.s sumption \vhich levels the playing field among
the t\VO firms when they compete in investments. It essentially means that the

di

20The second order condition is satisfied ifα+2β< 1 and
is smal l. Similarly, the second
order condition for firm 2's problem below holds if 2α + ß < 1 and d 2 is small
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two firms are equally advantageous in supplying the input in which they enjoy an
efficiency advantage with respect to their partner.
Fr om equations (4.2) , (4.3) , and (4.4) we know that
*\*
7r 11 三.;> 7r
11 2

牛=今

> z~

z~

1 1' * \β... ^ *、 α

仁=>1 二1. \
\γ 2J

>

(二三}
\ 01

J

Imposing assumption 1 implies that
π; 三 π;

但中 (ri)β 三 (ß;)α

(4.7)

Thus , both the value of the two firm's investments as well as the importance of
each partner's input to joint production play a role in determining the identity of
the \vinner (i 后， the firm that ends up buying out the JV).
Fr om inequality (4.7) it follo\vs that when α= 仇 the firm that makes the
higher investment buys out the JV. Ifα>β ， this inequality implies that firm 1
must make a higher investment than firm 2 to be able to buy-out the JV. Note
that α>βimplies that input supplied by firm 1 in the JV (input x) is more
valuable than the input supplied by firm 2. Thus , the firm with the more vαluable
input actually has to invest a greater amount to beat out the other firm. 明屯的
matters at the investment stage is the value of the activity the two firms are
investing in: when α> ß, firm 2 is investing in a relatively more valuable activity
than firm 1 and consequently hωa stronger incentive to invest.
Proposition 3: Suppose di = d 2 α叫 Assumption 1 holds , then ri < ß;σ
αnd only if α > ß.
The above proposition informs us of the stronger investment incentive faced
by the partner who supplies the weaker input to the JV. Contrast this result with
the c泊e of complementary investments: in that scenario firm 1 has a stronger
incentive to invest iffα > ß. Here , firm 2 h臼 a stronger incentive to invest when
α> ß. The roles of the t\VO firms are reversed under competing investments:
under both scenarios , \vhenα> ß, investing in improving the efficiency of input
x is more valuable.
If a firm gets bought out , its payoff equals 8i 7r;. Let r~ denote firm 1's optimal
investment given that it is bought out by firm 2:
r~ 三 Arg m a..-x 8 1π i (r 1) 一 (r 1 一 γ 1 )cf{

Similarly, define
ß; 三 Argmax 8 2 π ;( 6. 2 ) 一(6. 2 - ð2)d~
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Since ()i < 1 , it immediately follows that r; < ri and ß~ < ß 2.
Note that the buying-out party's net payoff strictly decre臼es with its rival's
investment. This is because the buy-out price strictly increases with the boughtout P征ty's investment. Consequently, there exists a critical level of investment
on firm 2's part \vhich makes firm 1 indifferent between buying out firm 2 and
getting bought out itself. This critical investment ßf is defined by
可 (r~) 一 (r~ 一 γ 1) cf{ - ()2可 (ßf) = ()1 吋 (r~) 一 (r~ 一 γ 1) cf{

In the above equation , the left hand side gives firm 1's payoff given that it invests
ri and buys out firm 2 (who invests ßf) where前 the right hand side giv<白血rm
1's payoff given that it invests r~ and sells its share of the JV to firm 2.
Similarly, we can define rf as follows
π;(ß;) 一 (ß; - 82)d~ - ()1π~(rf)

= ()2π;(ß;)

一 (ß; - 82)d~

That is , rf is the level of investment on the part of firm 1 that makes firm 2
indifferent between buying out and bought out.
N ow we are ready to analyze investment competition between the two firrns.
For simplicity, we first consider the symmetric c臼e where the two firms are identical in every aspect: ()1 = ()2 ， α = ß, 81 =γ2 ， and dÏ = d2. Later , we comment
on the asymmetric case. In the symmetric case , we must have ri = ß; , 們 =ß~
and rf = 6. f. In addition , we can show the following:
Lemma 1: FOT the symmetric cαse， the folloωing hold:

(i) 6.; < 6. f < 6.;, and
戶i) The b叫 Tesponse function of firm 1, denoted by

if

αnd the best 7ì仰onse function of firm

2, denoted by B 2 (r 1) is given by
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if

r , < r?1 )

if

r , > r?1 )I

1.

1.

The reaction functions can be interpreted as follows. If firm 2 does not improve
its efficie叭y in activity x at all (.6. 2 = 82 ) , firm 1 's optimal investment is given
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by ri. Firm 1 will continue to invest the same amount if the investment by firm
2 is so small (ð. 2 < ð. f) that firm 1 prefers to buy-out firm 2 than be bought out
itself. Ho\vever , when ð. 2 > ð. f ，位rm 2's inve討mer札 and the buying-out price 前
a result , is so high that for firm 1 buying out is less profitable than being bought
out so that it reduces its own investment to r~ .21 These reaction functions yield
the following proposition.
Proposition 4: The symmetric competing investment 9 αme hαs two pure
strategy N ash equilibria: (ri , ð.;) and (吭，勾). In the (I了，ð.;)你Lilibrium， firm
1 buys out 少m2 仙的as in the 們， ß;) equilibrium firm 2 buys out firm 1.
The above proposition establishes that investment competition between the
two partners can indeed lead to the demise of the JV. In either equilibrium , a
firm buys out its partner by investing the optimal amount. The bought-out party
also invests in competing investment in order to receive the optimal buy-out price ,
though its investment is useless after the break-up of the JV.
If firms are not identical , as is normally the case , proposition 4 remains valid
as long as the degree of asymmetry between the firms is not high. For example ,
supposeα > ß. Then , the best response functions of the firms still have the same
shape as stated in lemma 1, and there would still be two equilibria. However ,
the buying叫 party in the (ri , ß;) equilibrium , i.e. firm 1, will invest 1臼s than
the buying-out party in the (吭， ß;) equilibrium , i.e. firm 2 , because ri < ð.; by
proposition 3.

5. Both Ty pes of Investments
The previous two sections explored two different models that highlight the incentives for t\vo different,:types of investments faced by the partners in a JV. In
this section~ \ve consider a model in which each partner may invest in improving
its e伍ciency in providing either of the two inputs. The basic insight we \vant to
provide (or confìrm) is that since complementary investments are mutually re~n
forcing \vhile competing investments are mutually destructive , a JV may evolve
into one of two possible equilibria: In one equilibriurn , the partners both opt
for complementary investments and the JV stays alive \vith an increased level
21 Since the JV enjoys a synergy due to complementarity but suffers from the under-provision
of input problem , a firm must invest a su伍 ceint amount in order for it to become more productive
than the JV and be able to buy' out its partne r. Here we assume that the optimal investments
rî and ß; are sufficient to render the JV an inefficient organizational form , \丸'hich must be true
if, say , the costs of i 盯estment (dt and d2) are sufficiently low.

17

of complementarity. In another equilibrium , the two partners choose competing
investments , reducing the complementarity of the JV thus causing it to fai l.
To simplify the analysis , we assume that firms can make both complementary
and competing investments only at fixed levels by paying some fuced investment
cost. Specifically, by investing an amount 月， firm i can reach a target e伍ciency of
ß i in input 凡 and by investing an amount G i , firm i can reach a target e伍ciency
of f i in input y. We first consider the cωe where each firm has three strategies
(Si = 0 , ß i or f i ). Later in this section, we examine the more general c品e where
firms can choose both complementary and competing investments simultaneously,
i.e. , ß i and f i is also a fe泊ible strategy.
We consider the simplest possible scenario and make the following set of natural assumptions:

A2. Symmetry αssumption: 81 =仇， α = ß, 81 = γ2. 8 2γ 1. ß 1 = r 2 =
X , ß2 = f 1 = Y，只 = F , and G i = G. In other words , the following are assumed:
(i) firms share the JV revenue equally; 何 both inputs are equally important 伽
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activity; and 戶U吵1) the feasible amount of investments of both types as well as the
corresponding costs for each type of investment are the same for both firms.
In what follo\vs , to economize on notation , we denote the initial JV revenue
1f/ (8 1, 12) by just 1f/. Note that under the symmetry assumptions ， πf=4.
M司len descri bing our other ωsumptions ， \ve refer only to firm 1 although they
apply to both firms.
A 3. Unilateral incentive for a complementary investment: π {(X， γ2) 一 π{> F.
This assull1ption means that a firm finds it profitable to make a complementary
investment even when its partner chooses not to invest. Since a complementary
the other 趾
fi rm'冶s incentive for a complementary
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on A3 automatically implies that π {(X ， X) 一 π {(X， γ2) > F
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A4. Unilα teral incentive for a competing investment: πi(Ól ， Y) - G >什J
That is , it is profitable for a firm to make a competing investment in order to buy
out its partner.
5.1. High Value of a Complementary Investment
\Ve first consider the case \vhere the parameter values are such that
可 (Ó1 ， Y) <π J(Ó1 ， X)
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(5.1)

That is , a complementary investment by either firm is sufficient to make the JV
the most profitable organizational form even if its partner makes a competing
investment.
Each firm has tlrree strategies: Si 巴 {O ， X , }'}. Under the assumptions made
above , the payoff nlatrix for this symmetric investment game (gross of investment
costs) is given by:
O

X
Y

X

。

7f~
可 (X ， 12)' 可 (X， 12)
πi(8 1 ， Y) 一 π2 ， πj

7rJ
IT

Y

刊 (X， X )， 吋 (X， X)
吋 (8 1 ， X) ， 可 (8 1 ， X)

-

折iJQ1' Y) , ~付 (81 ， Y)

Note that , since inequality (5.1) holds , only the cells (Y, O) and (Y, Y) corr令
spond to a failure of the JV. The JV stays alive even under (Y, X) because firm
2's complementary investment outweighs firm 1's competing investment. Under
(Y, Y) each firm has a fifty percent chance of buying out the JV. Its corresponding
payoff, under the symmetry assumption A2 , equals
1
1 "' _ _ 1
1 r
三
一二
， Y)1
=一 π~(81 ， Y).
2 |π~(81
1" " 1 \ - ， Y)
I
2 π;(Y，
\ - )γ2) +一2 π~(81
1 \
I J
_,

~)

~

I ~I

~ ~ I
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We can show the following result:
Proposition 5: Suppose A2-A4 αnd ineqωlity (5.1) hold. Then , there exist
tω Nash equilib門 ι (X ， X) and (Y: Y) ， σ

F-G 主佇立617X)-1πi(8
1 ， Y").
.:. \
2
Otherwis e~

(5.2)

(X , X) is the pnly Nash equilibrium

The above proposition says that~ regardless of \vhether inequality (5.2) holds or
not ，伏 ， X) is an equilibrium in \vhich both firms making complementary investments and the JV stays alive. This result follows from condition (5.1). However ,
if inequality (5.2) holds , then there exists another equilibrium (Y, Y) in which
both firms make competing investments and the JV fails. Given firm 1 plays Y ,
firm 2 can either play X in \vhich c 泊 e it keeps the JV alive , or it can play Y .
Since X may be more costly than Y (F > G) , a scenario consistent \vith condition
(5.1) in that a more valuable complementary investment is also likely to be more
expensive , firm 2 \vill choose Y if inequality (5.2) holds. In this case , (Y, Y) is also
a Nash equilibrium. We next examine the case \vhere a competing investment is
relatively nlore valuable than a complementary investment.
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5.2. High Value of a Competing Investment
Suppose that contrary to the

c品e

discussed above , we have

πi(8 1 ， Y) > πJ(8 1 ， X).

(5.3)

In other words , if firm 1 picks a competing investment , the JV ceas臼 to be the
dominant organizational form even if firm 2 makes a complementary investment.
In this c品e the payoff matrix (gross of investment costs) for the investment game
is given by:

。

X
Y

7TJ
1，

X

。
π2J

叫 (X， γ2) ，可 (X， γ2)
可 (8 1 ， Y) 一吋 Tπd

Y

可 (X， X) ， 叫 (X ， X)
叫 (81 ， Y)-~ 可 (8 2 ， X) ， !可 (8 2 ， X)

iπi(8 1 ， Y)

This payoff matrix differs from the previous one only in (Y, X) box. Now , a
competing investment by either firm is sufficient to end the JV. Such a situation is
likely when the e伍ciency improvement under a competing investment is large relative to the efficiency improvement attained under a complementary investment.
Accordingly, we 臼sume the following assumption .holds:
什 i(8 1 ， Y) - G 一封 >π {(X ， ì2) - F

(5 .4)

In other \vords , a competing investment Y is more profitable for firm 1 than a
complementary investment X , given that firm 2 invests nothing.
Proposition 6: Suppos ε that assumptions A2-A4 , inequalities (5.3) and (5.4)
hold. Then (X, X) is α Nash equilibrium of the gar附 σ

可川)-HAX) 一 G 三刊 (X， X) 一 F
Otherwise , the Nash equilibria ofthe game belong to the set

(5.5)

{(Y, 0) , (Y, X) , (Y, Y)}

Under condition (5.3) , a unilateral competing investment by one firm is suf五cient to render the JV an ine伍cient organizational form even if the other firm
makes a complementary investment. This tends to make the JV very unstable and
likely to fai l. This instability is reflected in the fact that if condition (5.5) is not
satisfied , the JV fails even if one of t. he two firms makes a competing investment ,
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i.e. if inequality (5.5) is not valid then the only equilibrium pattern is the failure
of the JV \vhich takes place in either (Y, O) , (Y, X) , or (Y, y).22
When condition (5.5) is 叫isfi叫 (X ， X) can also be an equilibrium. 23 Essentially, this happens when a competing investment is more costly than a complementary investment (G > F) , which is consistent with the high value of a
competing investment assumption (5.3). If this cost differential is relatively large ,
(X , X) may indeed be an equilibrium and the JV stays alive. Also note that if
firm 1 deviates 企om (X , X) to (Y, X) , it also has to pay firm 2 the buy-out price
equal to ~可 (8 2 ， X).
The basic insight provided by the above two propositions is ωfollows. JVs
suffer from an instability problem in that the inv<臼tment game has two equilibria,
one in which the JV stays alive and the other in \vhich it breaks down , regardless
of whether the parameter valu臼 favor the JV (condition (5.1)) or not (condition
(5.3)).

6. Conclusion
The major point of this paper is that since complementarity is an important motivation for the formation of JVs , \ve must look to the evolution of complementarity
between JV partners in order to better understand the dynamics of JVs. Using a
benchmark static model of a JV based on complementarity between its partners ,
\ve have argued that the evolution of this complementarity can be determined
endogenously via the investment choices made by the t\vo partners. In the complementary investment game , \ve characterize how firms' incentives to incre臼e the
synergy of the JV depend on the importance of their inputs to the JV , as well as
their shares of the JV:s revenue. The very nature of a JV, i.e. partners share the
fruit of the JV , leads to under-provision of effort in both the investment stage and
the output stage. It is sho\vn that the optimal revenue sharing scheme has the
feature that the partner \vhose input is more important to the JV should control
a majority of the JV shares.
In the competing investment game, we have examined JV partners' incentives
to learn fronl each other , and shown that such mutuallearning can indeed lead to a
break-up of the JV. In the last part of the paper , \ve consider a model in which both
22 Ìvlore restrictions on parameter values can be imposed to clearify when each of the three
strategy pairs are an equilibrium. But , this is unnecessary since we are only interested in the
JV breaking up in equilibrium .
2J Condition (5 .4) is 的 t needed for (X , X ) to be an eq山libriu Ill.
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partners can choose the type of its investment. This more general model brings
together the insights of the previous two models and shows how multiple N臼h
equilibria cφexist even under assumptions that favor the continuation of the JV.
Thus , JVs may suffer from a lack of co- ordination: complementary investments
may indeed be in the interest of both parties but the very possibility of imbibing
each other's skills leads firms to makes competing investments that lead to the
demise of the JV.
How JV partners share the revenue generated from joint production is one of
the most sensitive and crucial policy issues in many international joint ventures.
Our analysis offers the insight that the share issue is not merely a matter of control ,
it may determine the very fate of the JV through its effect on the evolution of
the complementarity between partner firms. Although we explicitly examine the
share issue in only the complementary investment game , it is not hard to see that
optimal determination of the JV shares , can prolong the life of the JV in both the
competing investment game and the twφtype investment game of section 5. In
particul缸， when the shares are chosen to minimize the under-provision of efforts
problem (i.e. to maximize the value of the JV) , a buy-out becomes less likely in
the competing investment game (可 > 7r J is less likely to hold). Similarly, in the
3 x 3 game of section 5, the optimal sh位es maximize the synergy of the JV via
complementary investments making condition (5.2) in proposition 5 less likely to
hold and condition (5.5) in proposition 6 more likely to hold. As a result , the
(X , X) equilibrium is more likely to arise relative to the 忱的 equilibrium.
Finally, \ve offer some comments on the generality of the analysis contained in
this pape r. Although \ve use the Cobb-Douglas production function to model the
complementarity of the JV partners , \ve believe that most of the results obtained
in this pa per \vill continue to hold in a more general mode l. In fact , Proposition
5 and 6 are based on general profit functions \vith no reference to the CobbDouglas production function at all. The main point of Proposition 1, namely that
the partners' incentive for complementary investments incre臼 e with the importance of t. heir inputs to the JV , obviously is a general one. The same can be
said about proposition 3 \vhich says that a firm's competing investment incentive
increases with the importance of its partner's input to the JV. The C
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function; the derivation of the optimal and the criticallevel of investment , as well
as the best rωponse function , hold generally.

7. Appendix
7.1. Proof of Proposition 1
From the first order conditions of the two firms we have:
L\ i

fh

(1 一 α)α

r2

()2

(1 -

(7.1)

ß)ß

which straightforwardly implies part (的 of the proposition.
When ()i = 1/2 ,equation (7.1) implies that r; > L\ i iffβ 一 α >(ß 一 α )(ß+ α).
Since 1 >β+α ，the second inequality holds iff ß > α..
7.2. Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the proposition , we need first to examine how changes in JV shares affect
the equilibrium investment levels and to establish lemma 2 below.
At the Nash equilibrium , firm 1 optimizes over L\ 1
M仰。 1(1 一 α )zJ( 缸， r 2 ， ()1) - d( L\ l

yielding

the 五rst

-

81)

order condition
。 θzJ(l~q ， r2 ， ()1)
1θL\ l

一

d
1 一α

(7.2)

The above equation implicitly defines firm l 's best response function L\ 1
Its slope is given by
θ 2zJ

θL\ l

δ ð. lθr2

θr 2

否?

δ 2zJ

,

wh仙 is positive since ð~:在 >0 叫宏緝j<0b句
叭t伽
y
t
the problem.
Firm 2 maximiz 臼 over r 2
M ax (1 -

ed(l - ß)zJ (L\ l , 口， ()d 23

d(r 2 一 γ 2)

=

L\ 1(r2).

yielding the first order condition

(1 - ( 1 )

θZl( 6. 1 ， r 2 ， 01d
θr 2

1-

(7.3)
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The slope of 五rm 2's best response function (defined implicitly by the above
equation) equals
~2_J

主主一詭計;\仇
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θ 6.
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The N ash equilibrium is stable if the slope of firm 1's best response function is
steeper than that of firm 2 at the equilibrium. This condition can be written as: 24

δ 2Z1 θ2Z1

(

θ2ZJ\2

(7 .4)

δAi 否Z> 人 δ6. 1θ r 2 )

To see how the equilibrium depends on 01 , we differentiate both sides of the
two first order conditions (7.2) and (7.3) , respectively, with respect to 01 , and
rearrange terms , to obtain
θ2Z1 β 企 1θ2Z Jβr?θZl

,

0 1 一一一一一土 +0 ，
θ 6. 1θ 0 1

.

θ2Z1
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δ ß 1θ ß 1 80 1
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( 1 ) 一τ 一一=一一一 (1 - ( 1 )
- ~ / 8r~δ0 1
θ r 2θ r 2θ 0 1

Solving for 說~ and 訝 we get
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24It can be shown that for the Cob b- Douglas production function the stability condition is
satisfied if and only ifα。< (1- 2α- ß)(l 一 α-2β) which holds ifαand ß are not too large.
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Note that B > 0 by the stabi1ity condition (7.4).
Lemma 2: 1f α>β and 8 1 < 1/2 , then the folloωing hold in equilibrium:

ω 託>託;
( ii) ~~~ > 0 , G > 0 , H > 0;
( iii) 對> 0 , if 3ß + α<1

Proof: -By the first order conditions determi凶ng (6. i , f;) , we get
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have the same sign 俗話 It is straightforward to show that the J\尸s output , zl ,
as a function of 8 1, is maximi叫 at 8 1α /(α+β) ， given 6. 1 and f 2. Thus ,
~~~ > 0 for 8 < 1/2. This proves (“)
Straightforward a1gebra shows that
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Since α+3β< 1 implies 晶可< 1 : 也e 1前t inequality holds for 8 1 < 1/2. This ,
峙伽 \vith G > 0 , implies 削兮兮f>0.
vVe next prove proposition 2 by showing that when α>βthe joint payoffs 0 1'
the two partners Hl \vhere
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Straightfonvard derivation shows that

Using equation (7.1) , \ve obtain
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This im plies that term 2 in the RHS of
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Using the first order condition pertaining to (.ðq , r 2 ) , we can show that term 3
in equation (7.7) equals (1- 28 1d) which is nonnegative since 8 1 三 1/2 (assuming
d 三 1) .

Finally, by part (“) of the above lemma , G > 0 and H > 0 so that term 1
must be positive. Therefore , expression E must be positive , which establishes that
gz>O forα > ß and 8 1 三 1/2. Thus , the optimal share 8~ 三 1/2 if α>βThe
saine proof impli臼 that ifα 三 ß ， then firm 2's share of JV must be greater or
equal to half, namely, 8~ 三 1/2. This prov臼 the proposition

.

7.3. Proof of Proposition 3
From the two first order conditions (4.5) and (4.6) we have:
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lß J

ß, then the RHS of the above equation is greater than 1. This implies that
r~ < [~;]主諾 <A;

by noting 1 - 2α -ß<l 一 α - 2ß and ~2 > 1.
On the other hand , it is easy to see that α > ß is also necessary for ri < ~2.
ln fact , suppose rî < ~2 but α 三 ß. Then 1- 2α -ß 三 1 一 α- 2ß. This implies
that the LHS of equatiorí (7.8) is greater than 1 but the RHS is less or equal to
1. This contradiction shows that α > ß if ri < ~2. •
7.4. Proof of Lemma 1
的 For

the symrnetric case , denote the common profit function as
common cost parameter as d. Let
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Sirnilarly, suppose r* 三 /::).C. Then ,
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which also contradicts equation (7.9).
(“) Consider the best response function of firm 1. For /::).2 < /::).f , firm 1 prefers
buying out firm 2 to being bought out by the definition of /::).f. Since ßf < ri
by part (i) of the lemma , investing ri will indeed guarantee 叫 (r i) >可 (ß 2 )
by the symmetry 泊sumption and thus enable firm 1 to buy out the JV. Thus ,
Bl (/::).2) = fr. Similarly, for /::).2 > ð. f firm 1 prefers to be bought out by investing
f~. Since /::).f > f~ ， investing f~ leads to πi(f~) <仿 (/::).2) and hence a buy-out
by firm 2. Thus , Bl (/::).2) = f~. If ð. 2 = ð.乞 firm 1 is indifferent bet\veen buying
out and bought out , and Bl( ð. f) = {f~ ， fi}. This prov臼 part (“) .圓
7.5. Proof of Proposition 4

By Lemma 1, Bl (/::).;)
fr (because ð.;三ð. f ) and B 2 (fi) = ð.; (because
fr 三 ff). Thus , (fi , /::).;) is a Nash equilibrium. •
7.6. Proof of Proposition 5
Fi的 note that (0 , 0) is not a N叫 Equilibrium (NE) by 品sumption A3. Also
note that (X , O) is not a NE either because , given 臼sumption A3 , firm 2 wants to
deviate to (X , X). Next , (Y, O) is not a NE because assumption A3 and inequality
(5.1) implies that firm 2 \vants to move to (Y, X). Furthermore , (Y, X) is not a
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NE either because firm 1 wants to move to (0 , X) to save the investment cost G.
Thus , by symmetry, only 伏 ， X) and (Y, Y) are equilibrium candida他.
First consider (X , X): Given that firm 2 plays X , firm 1 prefers X to Y since
assumption A3 implies that
佇立X， X) - F > π {(8 1 ， X) >π {(8 1 ， X) - G

By assumption A3 , firm 2 also prefers X to O. Thus (X , X) is a NE.
Next consider (Y, Y) as an equilibrium candidate. Under (Y, Y) each firm's
payoff is !付 (8 1 ， Y) - G. Given that firm 1 plays Y , firm 2 prefers X to 0 by
assumption A3 and inequality (5.1). Th凶， firm 2's best response when firm 1
plays Y is also Y if and only if

jπ; 川) - G 全村川
This completes the proof. •
7.7. Proof of Proposition 6

As proved in the proof of proposition 5 , strategy pairs (0 , 0) , (X , O) cannot be
a Nash equilibrium. From assumption A3 , it is obvious that (X , X) is a N臼h
equilibrium if and only if the inequality stated in the proposition holds.
Now consider the case this inequality does not hold. In this c臼 e ， firm 1's best
response to firm 2:s playing 0 or playing X are both Y (by noting assumption A3
and in叩ality (5.4)). This implies that , the Nash equilibrium candidates ofthe
game in this case can only be (Y, O): (Y, X) , and (Y, Y). It is easy to see that the
candidate that yields the :highest payoff (net of investment costs) for firm 2 is the
N ash equilibrium. 圖
,
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Dr. Yill-chum!

70

(26月 7)

CPPS

Estimating British Workers.' Demand for Safery

Dr. Xiangdong Wei

71 (27/97) CPPS

72

(28月 7)

73

(1 月 8)

74

CPPS

Managerial Stress in Hong Kong and

Tai\、 an :

A Comparative Study

Won 立

Ms . Oi-ling Siu
Dr. LlI O Lu and
Professor Cary L. Coopcr

Teaching Social Science in the East Asian Context

Professor William T. Li ll

CPPS

Interpreting the Basic Law with Chinese Characteristics

Professor James C. Hsillng

(2月 8)

CPPS

Worker Participation and Firm Perforn1ance : Evidence from Germany and Britain

Profcssor John T. Addison.
Professor W. Stanley Siebcrl
Prokssor Joachim Wagncr <1 11 (1
Dr. Xiangdong \V ei

75

(3 月 8)

CPPS

The Nature ofOptimal Public Policy

Professor Lok-sang Ho

76

(4月 8)

CPPS

Symbolic Boundarics and Middle Class Forrnation in Hong Kong

ìvls . Annie H. K Chan

77

(5月 8)

CPPS

Urbanization in Sha Tin and Tuen MlI n - Problems and Coping Strategies

f\ 1r. Hong-kin Kwok and

Mr. Shing-tak Chan
78

(6月 8)

CAPS

Coping

79

(7月 8)

CAPS

Ncw World Ordcr and a Ncw U.S. Policv Toward China

\、/Ì th

Contagion : Europc and the Asian Economic Crisi s

Dr. ßrian Bridges
Prokssor Jamcs C. Hsill l1!.!

No.

旦控

Author

80 (8/98) CPPS

Poverty Policy in Hong Kong : Westem Models and Cultural Divergence

D r. William Lee and
Professor John Edwards

The Paradox of Hong Kong as a Non-Sovereign lntemational Actor

Professor James C. Hsiung

81

(9月 8)

82

(10月 8)

CAPS

Political lmpacts ofCatholic Education in Decolonization: Hong Kong and Macau

D r. Beatrice Leung

83

(11 月 8)

CAPS

The Rise and Fall ofthe HK Economy

Professor Lok -sang Ho

84

(12月 8)

CAPS

中國貿易保護代價的測算:方法、結論和意義

張曙光教授

的 (13/98)

CAPS

中國居民收入差距的擴大及其原因

趙人偉教授、李實教授

的 (14月 8)

CAPS

The Labor lncome Tax Equivalent of Price Scissors in Pre-Reform China

D r. Hiroyuki lmai

87 (15/98) CPPS

Complementarity , lnvestment lncentives , and Evolution of Joint Ventures

D r. Ping Li n and D r. Kamal Saggi

CAPS

